NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

NASA-LLIS-0124

1992-01-01T00:00:00Z

NASA-LLIS-0124; Lessons Learned - Payload Bay Duct Heater Overtemp NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Description of Driving Event:
The payload bay duct heater adds measured quantities of heat independently to each duct system. This raises the temperature of the process air from the cooling coils to the desired interface temperature leaving the portable purge unit and engine control system room. With no overtemp switches installed, excessive heat from the payload bay duct heaters burned through the duct insulation, causing severe damage with a potential for orbiter damage.

NASA-LLIS-1123

1999-01-01T00:00:00Z

NASA-LLIS-1123; Lessons Learned - Aero-Space Technology/X-Vehicle Range Safety/Authority NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Description of Driving Even:
Lack of NASA Range Safety Authority for X-33 and X-34 Programs

NASA-LLIS-1715

2005-01-01T00:00:00Z

NASA-LLIS-1715; Lessons Learned - The Pitfalls of "Engineering-by-Presentation" (2005) NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Abstract:
Formal documentation of requirements, resolutions, and decisions was once a standard NASA practice. However, the increased use of informal documentation such as viewgraphs and e-mail may be inhibiting the ability of NASA projects to reference the basis for technical decisions and to validate or verify engineering designs. Produce a record of technical decisions and supporting information within technical reports and memos as a standard practice across the institution, with a defined process for review, approval, and records management.

NASA-LLIS-1485

2004-01-01T00:00:00Z

NASA-LLIS-1485; Lessons Learned – The Risk Reduction From ?Two-fers? (Multiple Sister Spacecraft) May Outweigh the Incremental Cost (2002) NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Abstract:
NASA elected at the end of MER Phase A to build a second Mars Exploration Rover at an estimated cost of $243 million. In addition to potentially doubling science return from Mars and mitigating the program impact were a rover to fail, this "two-fer" approach proved helpful in controlling development risks. Consider the benefits to system development and I&T that may accrue from building a "sister" spacecraft and from maintaining multiple testbeds.