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NASA-LLIS-0918
Lessons Learned – Evolution of Mission Requirements for Support Equipment
Year: 2000
Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
During installation of the Thermal Micrometeorite Guard (TMG), the Short Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) #3018 fell from the EMU ground test fixture (EGTF) to the floor. The primary cause of the mishap was that the EGTF was not used in a manner for which it was designed or assessed. The EGTF was designed and certified for 4-pin operations. The design of the TMG required a 3-pin operation during installation (one pin had to be removed.) The existing procedure for installation of the TMG on the SEMU did not address how the SEMU is to be handled or positioned, nor was there a procedure for the use of the EGTF. During this particular mishap, the TMG installation was being conducted with the [front] of the SEMU down. With the front of the SEMU facing up, this type of mishap would probably never occur because of the design of the pin receptacles. Proper procedures for installation of the TMG with the SEMU in an EGTF could have prevented this incident. Even thought this potential for mishap has existed since the EGTF was introduced in 1983, its presence was either recognized and not documented in a hazard analysis or not recognized at all. No formal training plan or objectives exist for personnel who handle flight equipment in the EMU laboratory. While OJT apprenticeship was implemented for these operations, there are neither measurable requirements nor documentation to support successful completion of training.
During installation of the Thermal Micrometeorite Guard (TMG), the Short Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) #3018 fell from the EMU ground test fixture (EGTF) to the floor. The primary cause of the mishap was that the EGTF was not used in a manner for which it was designed or assessed. The EGTF was designed and certified for 4-pin operations. The design of the TMG required a 3-pin operation during installation (one pin had to be removed.) The existing procedure for installation of the TMG on the SEMU did not address how the SEMU is to be handled or positioned, nor was there a procedure for the use of the EGTF. During this particular mishap, the TMG installation was being conducted with the [front] of the SEMU down. With the front of the SEMU facing up, this type of mishap would probably never occur because of the design of the pin receptacles. Proper procedures for installation of the TMG with the SEMU in an EGTF could have prevented this incident. Even thought this potential for mishap has existed since the EGTF was introduced in 1983, its presence was either recognized and not documented in a hazard analysis or not recognized at all. No formal training plan or objectives exist for personnel who handle flight equipment in the EMU laboratory. While OJT apprenticeship was implemented for these operations, there are neither measurable requirements nor documentation to support successful completion of training.
Subject: Administration/Organization
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| contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T18:01:13Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T18:01:13Z | |
| date copyright | 36816 | |
| date issued | 2000 | |
| identifier other | FYTEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | http://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/184292 | |
| description abstract | Description of Driving Event: During installation of the Thermal Micrometeorite Guard (TMG), the Short Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) #3018 fell from the EMU ground test fixture (EGTF) to the floor. The primary cause of the mishap was that the EGTF was not used in a manner for which it was designed or assessed. The EGTF was designed and certified for 4-pin operations. The design of the TMG required a 3-pin operation during installation (one pin had to be removed.) The existing procedure for installation of the TMG on the SEMU did not address how the SEMU is to be handled or positioned, nor was there a procedure for the use of the EGTF. During this particular mishap, the TMG installation was being conducted with the [front] of the SEMU down. With the front of the SEMU facing up, this type of mishap would probably never occur because of the design of the pin receptacles. Proper procedures for installation of the TMG with the SEMU in an EGTF could have prevented this incident. Even thought this potential for mishap has existed since the EGTF was introduced in 1983, its presence was either recognized and not documented in a hazard analysis or not recognized at all. No formal training plan or objectives exist for personnel who handle flight equipment in the EMU laboratory. While OJT apprenticeship was implemented for these operations, there are neither measurable requirements nor documentation to support successful completion of training. | |
| language | English | |
| title | NASA-LLIS-0918 | num |
| title | Lessons Learned – Evolution of Mission Requirements for Support Equipment | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 3 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;2000 | |
| contenttype | fulltext | |
| subject keywords | Administration/Organization | |
| subject keywords | Configuration Management | |
| subject keywords | Flight Equipment | |
| subject keywords | Flight Operations | |
| subject keywords | Ground Equipment | |
| subject keywords | Ground Operations | |
| subject keywords | Hardware | |
| subject keywords | Policy & Planning | |
| subject keywords | Risk Management/Assessment | |
| subject keywords | Test & Verification | |
| subject keywords | Test Article | |
| subject keywords | Test Facility | |
| subject keywords | Training Equipment |