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NASA-LLIS-0020

Lessons Learned - Debris Causing Component Failure in a Critical Piece of Crew Equipment (Shuttle Orbiter Launch/Entry Coverall Pressurization System)

Organization:
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Year: 1991

Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
A dual suit pressure controller failed to pressurize a crew coverall during manned suit testing and the shuttle flight STS-37 Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test (TCDT). The coverall is donned by an orbiter crew member during launch and entry. No previous failures of this type had occurred before. Upon disassembly of the suit, a small piece of fabric reinforced elastomer material (from a seal called a neck dam that separates the head and torso parts of the coverall) was found lodged inside the controller on the primary diaphragm assembly seat. Before the TCDT, a rapid replacement of the neck dam was performed. The usual, but undocumented, step in the replacement procedure that called for component removal before changing the neck dam did not occur. The piece of elastomer from the old neck dam remained in the suit as debris and migrated to the diaphragm during the pressure cycling. The corrective actions included: (1) documenting the procedural steps to require component removal, (2) protecting the component area from debris by adding plastic sheeting, and (3) vacuuming the inner volume of the coverall and inspecting it following all maintenance work. A failure of a coverall of this type during flight could result in the loss of the crew member if cabin pressurization failed.
URI: http://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/185849
Subject: Flight Equipment
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  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
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    NASA-LLIS-0020

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contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T18:02:56Z
date available2017-09-04T18:02:56Z
date copyright08/22/1991
date issued1991
identifier otherGCYCQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttp://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/185849
description abstractDescription of Driving Event:
A dual suit pressure controller failed to pressurize a crew coverall during manned suit testing and the shuttle flight STS-37 Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test (TCDT). The coverall is donned by an orbiter crew member during launch and entry. No previous failures of this type had occurred before. Upon disassembly of the suit, a small piece of fabric reinforced elastomer material (from a seal called a neck dam that separates the head and torso parts of the coverall) was found lodged inside the controller on the primary diaphragm assembly seat. Before the TCDT, a rapid replacement of the neck dam was performed. The usual, but undocumented, step in the replacement procedure that called for component removal before changing the neck dam did not occur. The piece of elastomer from the old neck dam remained in the suit as debris and migrated to the diaphragm during the pressure cycling. The corrective actions included: (1) documenting the procedural steps to require component removal, (2) protecting the component area from debris by adding plastic sheeting, and (3) vacuuming the inner volume of the coverall and inspecting it following all maintenance work. A failure of a coverall of this type during flight could result in the loss of the crew member if cabin pressurization failed.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-0020num
titleLessons Learned - Debris Causing Component Failure in a Critical Piece of Crew Equipment (Shuttle Orbiter Launch/Entry Coverall Pressurization System)en
typestandard
page2
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1991
contenttypefulltext
subject keywordsFlight Equipment
subject keywordsFlight Operations
subject keywordsParts Materials & Processes
subject keywordsPersonal Protective Equipment
subject keywordsSpacecraft
subject keywordsTest & Verification
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