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NASA-LLIS-0342

Lessons Learned - Critical Hardware Functional Verification

Organization:
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Year: 1994

Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
On the STS 51/TOS mission, during payload deployment, commands intended to initiate only the primary SUPER*ZIP explosive cord actually resulted in the simultaneous firing of both the primary explosive cord and back-up explosive cord. This simultaneous explosive cord firing resulted in the rupture of a SUPER*ZIP containment tube and the release of contaminants and high energy debris into the orbiter cargo bay.
URI: http://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/191524
Subject: Energetic Materials - Explosive/Propellant/Pyrotechnic
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  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
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    NASA-LLIS-0342

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contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T18:08:29Z
date available2017-09-04T18:08:29Z
date copyright08/09/1994
date issued1994
identifier otherGSAEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttp://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/191524
description abstractDescription of Driving Event:
On the STS 51/TOS mission, during payload deployment, commands intended to initiate only the primary SUPER*ZIP explosive cord actually resulted in the simultaneous firing of both the primary explosive cord and back-up explosive cord. This simultaneous explosive cord firing resulted in the rupture of a SUPER*ZIP containment tube and the release of contaminants and high energy debris into the orbiter cargo bay.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-0342num
titleLessons Learned - Critical Hardware Functional Verificationen
typestandard
page2
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1994
contenttypefulltext
subject keywordsEnergetic Materials - Explosive/Propellant/Pyrotechnic
subject keywordsHardware
subject keywordsSafety & Mission Assurance
subject keywordsTest & Verification
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DSpace software copyright © 2017-2020  DuraSpace
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