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NASA-LLIS-1207

Lessons Learned – Capitalizing on Proven Processes

Organization:
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Year: 1999

Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
Prior to flight 1A/R and 2A the International Space Station Program (ISSP) and the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) was found to have two separate certification requirements that required the hardware providers to furnish a delta certification on operational hardware with flight heritage and a good pedigree of performance. It was found that this was causing additional work, expense, and schedule problems as we got closer to flight time. This problem was identified in an EA presentation to the program on 10/29/98 and a process for resolution was formulated in a letter from Director Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) on 12-8-98 (REF NA-98-085). This letter formed a "Common Hardware Assessment Panel" now known as the "Grandfather Board" to define the process and provide the disposition for each hardware certification.
Root cause: The root cause of the problem was that two independent programs established certification requirements for their vehicles. Since the vehicles serve different purposes and function differently it should have been expected that different certification requirements would be developed. Even with these differences it was found that the differences were minor and could be overcome with proper analysis and compromise.
URI: http://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/194076
Subject: Administration/Organization
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  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
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    NASA-LLIS-1207

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contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T18:11:01Z
date available2017-09-04T18:11:01Z
date copyright04/26/1999
date issued1999
identifier otherGYVEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttp://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/194076
description abstractDescription of Driving Event:
Prior to flight 1A/R and 2A the International Space Station Program (ISSP) and the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) was found to have two separate certification requirements that required the hardware providers to furnish a delta certification on operational hardware with flight heritage and a good pedigree of performance. It was found that this was causing additional work, expense, and schedule problems as we got closer to flight time. This problem was identified in an EA presentation to the program on 10/29/98 and a process for resolution was formulated in a letter from Director Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) on 12-8-98 (REF NA-98-085). This letter formed a "Common Hardware Assessment Panel" now known as the "Grandfather Board" to define the process and provide the disposition for each hardware certification.
Root cause: The root cause of the problem was that two independent programs established certification requirements for their vehicles. Since the vehicles serve different purposes and function differently it should have been expected that different certification requirements would be developed. Even with these differences it was found that the differences were minor and could be overcome with proper analysis and compromise.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-1207num
titleLessons Learned – Capitalizing on Proven Processesen
typestandard
page3
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1999
contenttypefulltext
subject keywordsAdministration/Organization
subject keywordsConfiguration Management
subject keywordsExternal Relations
subject keywordsFlight Equipment
subject keywordsFlight Operations
subject keywordsGround Equipment
subject keywordsGround Operations
subject keywordsHardware
subject keywordsIndependent Verification and Validation
subject keywordsLaunch Process
subject keywordsNASA Standards
subject keywordsPayloads
subject keywordsPolicy & Planning
subject keywordsProcurement Small Business & Industrial Relations
subject keywordsRange Operations
subject keywordsResearch & Development
subject keywordsRisk Management/Assessment
subject keywordsSafety & Mission Assurance
subject keywordsSoftware
subject keywordsSpacecraft
subject keywordsStandard
subject keywordsTest & Verification
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