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Lessons Learned – Inadvertent Powering of the Deep Space 2 Mars Microprobe (1998)

contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T18:24:37Z
date available2017-09-04T18:24:37Z
date copyright06/21/1999
date issued1999
identifier otherIHCEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttp://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/206960
description abstractAbstract:
During final assembly of the Deep Space 2 (DS2) Mars Microprobes, each of the two flight probes was inadvertently powered. The design of the mechanical switches was found to permit inadvertent ground paths during assembly, which could cause loss of mission due to undetected battery depletion prior to launch. System design must address hardware performance during assembly and test as well as during flight. Safing devices should be operational throughout assembly and test operations. Design analyses such as FMEA, SCA, and FTA must examine the electrical implications of mechanical/packaging design decisions.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-0626num
titleLessons Learned – Inadvertent Powering of the Deep Space 2 Mars Microprobe (1998)en
typestandard
page4
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1999
contenttypefulltext
subject keywordsDesign for Manufacturability
subject keywordsDesign for Testability
subject keywordsFlight Equipment
subject keywordsGround Operations
subject keywordsHardware
subject keywordsHardware Fabrication and Test
subject keywordsHardware Safety
subject keywordsInherited Design
subject keywordsParts Materials & Processes
subject keywordsPower Switch
subject keywordsSafety & Mission Assurance
subject keywordsSneak Circuit Analysis (SCA)
subject keywordsSpacecraft
subject keywordsSystem Development
subject keywordsSystem Integration and Test
subject keywordsTest & Verification


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