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NASA-LLIS-0626
Lessons Learned – Inadvertent Powering of the Deep Space 2 Mars Microprobe (1998)
Year: 1999
Abstract: Abstract:
During final assembly of the Deep Space 2 (DS2) Mars Microprobes, each of the two flight probes was inadvertently powered. The design of the mechanical switches was found to permit inadvertent ground paths during assembly, which could cause loss of mission due to undetected battery depletion prior to launch. System design must address hardware performance during assembly and test as well as during flight. Safing devices should be operational throughout assembly and test operations. Design analyses such as FMEA, SCA, and FTA must examine the electrical implications of mechanical/packaging design decisions.
During final assembly of the Deep Space 2 (DS2) Mars Microprobes, each of the two flight probes was inadvertently powered. The design of the mechanical switches was found to permit inadvertent ground paths during assembly, which could cause loss of mission due to undetected battery depletion prior to launch. System design must address hardware performance during assembly and test as well as during flight. Safing devices should be operational throughout assembly and test operations. Design analyses such as FMEA, SCA, and FTA must examine the electrical implications of mechanical/packaging design decisions.
Subject: Design for Manufacturability
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| contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T18:24:37Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T18:24:37Z | |
| date copyright | 06/21/1999 | |
| date issued | 1999 | |
| identifier other | IHCEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | http://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho162s7D8308/handle/yse/206960 | |
| description abstract | Abstract: During final assembly of the Deep Space 2 (DS2) Mars Microprobes, each of the two flight probes was inadvertently powered. The design of the mechanical switches was found to permit inadvertent ground paths during assembly, which could cause loss of mission due to undetected battery depletion prior to launch. System design must address hardware performance during assembly and test as well as during flight. Safing devices should be operational throughout assembly and test operations. Design analyses such as FMEA, SCA, and FTA must examine the electrical implications of mechanical/packaging design decisions. | |
| language | English | |
| title | NASA-LLIS-0626 | num |
| title | Lessons Learned – Inadvertent Powering of the Deep Space 2 Mars Microprobe (1998) | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 4 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1999 | |
| contenttype | fulltext | |
| subject keywords | Design for Manufacturability | |
| subject keywords | Design for Testability | |
| subject keywords | Flight Equipment | |
| subject keywords | Ground Operations | |
| subject keywords | Hardware | |
| subject keywords | Hardware Fabrication and Test | |
| subject keywords | Hardware Safety | |
| subject keywords | Inherited Design | |
| subject keywords | Parts Materials & Processes | |
| subject keywords | Power Switch | |
| subject keywords | Safety & Mission Assurance | |
| subject keywords | Sneak Circuit Analysis (SCA) | |
| subject keywords | Spacecraft | |
| subject keywords | System Development | |
| subject keywords | System Integration and Test | |
| subject keywords | Test & Verification |