NATO AEP-7
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defence Factors in the Design, Testing and Acceptance of Military Equipment - ED 4
Organization:
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Year: 2000
Abstract: This Allied Engineering Publication (AEP) provides the materiel acquisition community with design guidelines, acceptance test procedures and acceptance criteria for designing military equipment. These guidelines are provided to ensure that materiel used on the battlefield can be operated by personnel in a protective posture and will survive in a Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) atmosphere should it occur. This publication is also provided to offer information regarding the impact of decontamination on design and materials. These guidelines do not dictate requirements for the layout, configuration or construction of military equipment nor for the selection of materials to be used for that equipment. Rather, it is aimed at familiarizing the designer of military equipment with the peculiarities of NBC warfare, so as to enable him to take the proper actions in choosing designs and materials.
NBC Contamination survivability (NBCCS) is defined as the capability of a system and its crew to withstand an NBC-contaminated environment, including decontamination, without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned mission. This AEP is not concerned with the initial effects of nuclear weapons as this is discussed in AEP-4. This AEP does however pertain to contamination by radioactive deposits and the effects of neutron induced radioactivity as well as concerns pertaining to contamination by low level radiation (LLR). Because biological contamination is not known to damage equipment its effects are not addressed. This AEP makes the assumption that the decontaminants and methods used for removing chemical warfare (CW) contamination will also remove biological contamination and to some extent contamination from nuclear fallout. Therefore, the primary focus of this discussion will be CW contamination. This AEP does distinguish among test acceptance criteria and test procedures for N, B, and C contamination. Also of great concern is the possible presence of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs) and Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIMs) on the modern battlefield. While these particular aspects of modern warfare can not be ignored, the procedures described herein for NBCCS should be comprehensive enough to deal with these contingencies.
NBCCS will be stated as essential characteristics in appropriate requirements documents and used to design and test the survivability of mission essential equipment under development. Once applied to a developmental piece of equipment, these criteria will be modified only upon consideration of proven economic, technical, and/or operational reasons.
These criteria are engineering design criteria intended for use only in a developmental setting. They do not define doctrine or operational criteria for decontamination, establish protection criteria, provide guidelines on how to achieve the required survivability, establish test protocols, or specify survivability in training environments.
Finally, redundancy and resupply items cannot be the reason for ignoring hardening measures because these items may also become contaminated.
NBC Contamination survivability (NBCCS) is defined as the capability of a system and its crew to withstand an NBC-contaminated environment, including decontamination, without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned mission. This AEP is not concerned with the initial effects of nuclear weapons as this is discussed in AEP-4. This AEP does however pertain to contamination by radioactive deposits and the effects of neutron induced radioactivity as well as concerns pertaining to contamination by low level radiation (LLR). Because biological contamination is not known to damage equipment its effects are not addressed. This AEP makes the assumption that the decontaminants and methods used for removing chemical warfare (CW) contamination will also remove biological contamination and to some extent contamination from nuclear fallout. Therefore, the primary focus of this discussion will be CW contamination. This AEP does distinguish among test acceptance criteria and test procedures for N, B, and C contamination. Also of great concern is the possible presence of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs) and Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIMs) on the modern battlefield. While these particular aspects of modern warfare can not be ignored, the procedures described herein for NBCCS should be comprehensive enough to deal with these contingencies.
NBCCS will be stated as essential characteristics in appropriate requirements documents and used to design and test the survivability of mission essential equipment under development. Once applied to a developmental piece of equipment, these criteria will be modified only upon consideration of proven economic, technical, and/or operational reasons.
These criteria are engineering design criteria intended for use only in a developmental setting. They do not define doctrine or operational criteria for decontamination, establish protection criteria, provide guidelines on how to achieve the required survivability, establish test protocols, or specify survivability in training environments.
Finally, redundancy and resupply items cannot be the reason for ignoring hardening measures because these items may also become contaminated.
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contributor author | NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization | |
date accessioned | 2017-09-04T18:05:44Z | |
date available | 2017-09-04T18:05:44Z | |
date copyright | 09/01/2000 | |
date issued | 2000 | |
identifier other | GKJQSAAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
identifier uri | http://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsery=autho4703177D081D20686159DD6EC01B04CF/handle/yse/188654 | |
description abstract | This Allied Engineering Publication (AEP) provides the materiel acquisition community with design guidelines, acceptance test procedures and acceptance criteria for designing military equipment. These guidelines are provided to ensure that materiel used on the battlefield can be operated by personnel in a protective posture and will survive in a Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) atmosphere should it occur. This publication is also provided to offer information regarding the impact of decontamination on design and materials. These guidelines do not dictate requirements for the layout, configuration or construction of military equipment nor for the selection of materials to be used for that equipment. Rather, it is aimed at familiarizing the designer of military equipment with the peculiarities of NBC warfare, so as to enable him to take the proper actions in choosing designs and materials. NBC Contamination survivability (NBCCS) is defined as the capability of a system and its crew to withstand an NBC-contaminated environment, including decontamination, without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned mission. This AEP is not concerned with the initial effects of nuclear weapons as this is discussed in AEP-4. This AEP does however pertain to contamination by radioactive deposits and the effects of neutron induced radioactivity as well as concerns pertaining to contamination by low level radiation (LLR). Because biological contamination is not known to damage equipment its effects are not addressed. This AEP makes the assumption that the decontaminants and methods used for removing chemical warfare (CW) contamination will also remove biological contamination and to some extent contamination from nuclear fallout. Therefore, the primary focus of this discussion will be CW contamination. This AEP does distinguish among test acceptance criteria and test procedures for N, B, and C contamination. Also of great concern is the possible presence of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs) and Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIMs) on the modern battlefield. While these particular aspects of modern warfare can not be ignored, the procedures described herein for NBCCS should be comprehensive enough to deal with these contingencies. NBCCS will be stated as essential characteristics in appropriate requirements documents and used to design and test the survivability of mission essential equipment under development. Once applied to a developmental piece of equipment, these criteria will be modified only upon consideration of proven economic, technical, and/or operational reasons. These criteria are engineering design criteria intended for use only in a developmental setting. They do not define doctrine or operational criteria for decontamination, establish protection criteria, provide guidelines on how to achieve the required survivability, establish test protocols, or specify survivability in training environments. Finally, redundancy and resupply items cannot be the reason for ignoring hardening measures because these items may also become contaminated. | |
language | English | |
title | NATO AEP-7 | num |
title | Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defence Factors in the Design, Testing and Acceptance of Military Equipment - ED 4 | en |
type | standard | |
page | 96 | |
status | Active | |
tree | NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization:;2000 | |
contenttype | fulltext |