NASA-LLIS-0534
Lessons Learned – Materials Compatibility: Verifying Design Acceptability Prior to Manufacture and Distribution of Hardware
Year: 1997
Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
Space Station Oxygen quick disconnects (QD's) used silicon grease in the flow path of moderate to high pressure oxygen. The auto ignition temperature for this grease is 500 degree Fahrenheit and with pressures of 200 psia and above, adiabatic compression could have caused this grease to ignite, resulting in a catastrophic event on board. The material rating of the silicon grease stated in the Material Identification Usage Agreement (MIUL) was for 30% or less Oxygen concentrations at 14.7 psia or lower pressures, and not that of 100% O2 at elevated pressures. The vendor failed to observe that the test environment used to determine the MIUL rating as listed in the Materials and Processing Technical Information System (MAPTIS) did not match the actual operational environment. The error was caught by NASA materials and process engineers and representatives of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, but not before some of these QD's had already been shipped for installation in Node 1.
Space Station Oxygen quick disconnects (QD's) used silicon grease in the flow path of moderate to high pressure oxygen. The auto ignition temperature for this grease is 500 degree Fahrenheit and with pressures of 200 psia and above, adiabatic compression could have caused this grease to ignite, resulting in a catastrophic event on board. The material rating of the silicon grease stated in the Material Identification Usage Agreement (MIUL) was for 30% or less Oxygen concentrations at 14.7 psia or lower pressures, and not that of 100% O2 at elevated pressures. The vendor failed to observe that the test environment used to determine the MIUL rating as listed in the Materials and Processing Technical Information System (MAPTIS) did not match the actual operational environment. The error was caught by NASA materials and process engineers and representatives of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, but not before some of these QD's had already been shipped for installation in Node 1.
Subject: Parts Materials & Processes
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contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
date accessioned | 2017-09-04T18:42:42Z | |
date available | 2017-09-04T18:42:42Z | |
date copyright | 04/11/1997 | |
date issued | 1997 | |
identifier other | KACEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
identifier uri | http://yse.yabesh.ir/std;jsessionid=3826AF679D40527318548F1EFDEC014A/handle/yse/224152 | |
description abstract | Description of Driving Event: Space Station Oxygen quick disconnects (QD's) used silicon grease in the flow path of moderate to high pressure oxygen. The auto ignition temperature for this grease is 500 degree Fahrenheit and with pressures of 200 psia and above, adiabatic compression could have caused this grease to ignite, resulting in a catastrophic event on board. The material rating of the silicon grease stated in the Material Identification Usage Agreement (MIUL) was for 30% or less Oxygen concentrations at 14.7 psia or lower pressures, and not that of 100% O2 at elevated pressures. The vendor failed to observe that the test environment used to determine the MIUL rating as listed in the Materials and Processing Technical Information System (MAPTIS) did not match the actual operational environment. The error was caught by NASA materials and process engineers and representatives of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, but not before some of these QD's had already been shipped for installation in Node 1. | |
language | English | |
title | NASA-LLIS-0534 | num |
title | Lessons Learned – Materials Compatibility: Verifying Design Acceptability Prior to Manufacture and Distribution of Hardware | en |
type | standard | |
page | 2 | |
status | Active | |
tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1997 | |
contenttype | fulltext | |
subject keywords | Parts Materials & Processes |