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NASA-LLIS-0199
Lessons Learned - Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
Year: 1992
Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
The FRR process which leads to the launch decision is a part of a total management system comprised of many reviews. The chain of events which culminated in the STS 51-L accident indicates that the management process applied to critical flight safety issues was inadequate. The basic engineering understanding of the SRB field joint and the effects of operating at low temperatures was lacking. Prior qualification testing and analyses were not adequate to support SRB use in temperature ranges forecasted for the STS 51-L launch. The management tools, including the critical items list, did not adequately protect against the possibility of a fatal mishap. The launch decision followed established directives, but the engineering knowledge base supporting the launch decision was inadequate.
The FRR process which leads to the launch decision is a part of a total management system comprised of many reviews. The chain of events which culminated in the STS 51-L accident indicates that the management process applied to critical flight safety issues was inadequate. The basic engineering understanding of the SRB field joint and the effects of operating at low temperatures was lacking. Prior qualification testing and analyses were not adequate to support SRB use in temperature ranges forecasted for the STS 51-L launch. The management tools, including the critical items list, did not adequately protect against the possibility of a fatal mishap. The launch decision followed established directives, but the engineering knowledge base supporting the launch decision was inadequate.
Subject: Administration/Organization
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| contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T17:04:51Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T17:04:51Z | |
| date copyright | 33912 | |
| date issued | 1992 | |
| identifier other | YAZCQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | https://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/128443 | |
| description abstract | Description of Driving Event: The FRR process which leads to the launch decision is a part of a total management system comprised of many reviews. The chain of events which culminated in the STS 51-L accident indicates that the management process applied to critical flight safety issues was inadequate. The basic engineering understanding of the SRB field joint and the effects of operating at low temperatures was lacking. Prior qualification testing and analyses were not adequate to support SRB use in temperature ranges forecasted for the STS 51-L launch. The management tools, including the critical items list, did not adequately protect against the possibility of a fatal mishap. The launch decision followed established directives, but the engineering knowledge base supporting the launch decision was inadequate. | |
| language | English | |
| title | NASA-LLIS-0199 | num |
| title | Lessons Learned - Flight Readiness Review (FRR) | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 2 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1992 | |
| contenttype | fulltext | |
| subject keywords | Administration/Organization | |
| subject keywords | Policy & Planning | |
| subject keywords | Risk Management/Assessment | |
| subject keywords | Safety & Mission Assurance |