NASA-LLIS-1215
Lessons Learned – Human factors considerations for critical hardware lifts
Year: 1999
Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
After completion of the rotation of the Z-1 truss segment using a cab-operated 30-ton overhead bridge crane, the lifting device down rods were disconnected from the flight hardware. The task leader instructed the crane director on the floor to move the crane hook up to clear the trunnions. The crane director relayed the instructions over walkie-talkie radio to the crane operator in the cab. The crane operator inadvertently commanded the hook to move in the down direction causing the lifting device down rods to make contact with the trunnions on the Z-1 truss. The operation was stopped. After examination by the task team, the crane hook was moved up and the crane was placed in the parking area and impounded. There was evidence that all four trunnions received metal-to-metal contact from the down rods. A damage assessment is being conducted. There was no damage to the lifting device or Hydra-Set and no personnel were injured.
Root cause: The root cause was determined to be human error caused by a combination of less than optimum design of the crane cab controls; inadequate communications and understanding of hoist speeds; and the failure of the emergency stop-button operator to actuate the emergency stop.
After completion of the rotation of the Z-1 truss segment using a cab-operated 30-ton overhead bridge crane, the lifting device down rods were disconnected from the flight hardware. The task leader instructed the crane director on the floor to move the crane hook up to clear the trunnions. The crane director relayed the instructions over walkie-talkie radio to the crane operator in the cab. The crane operator inadvertently commanded the hook to move in the down direction causing the lifting device down rods to make contact with the trunnions on the Z-1 truss. The operation was stopped. After examination by the task team, the crane hook was moved up and the crane was placed in the parking area and impounded. There was evidence that all four trunnions received metal-to-metal contact from the down rods. A damage assessment is being conducted. There was no damage to the lifting device or Hydra-Set and no personnel were injured.
Root cause: The root cause was determined to be human error caused by a combination of less than optimum design of the crane cab controls; inadequate communications and understanding of hoist speeds; and the failure of the emergency stop-button operator to actuate the emergency stop.
Subject: Facilities
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| contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T15:15:37Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T15:15:37Z | |
| date copyright | 08/30/1999 | |
| date issued | 1999 | |
| identifier other | MGVEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | https://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/14622 | |
| description abstract | Description of Driving Event: After completion of the rotation of the Z-1 truss segment using a cab-operated 30-ton overhead bridge crane, the lifting device down rods were disconnected from the flight hardware. The task leader instructed the crane director on the floor to move the crane hook up to clear the trunnions. The crane director relayed the instructions over walkie-talkie radio to the crane operator in the cab. The crane operator inadvertently commanded the hook to move in the down direction causing the lifting device down rods to make contact with the trunnions on the Z-1 truss. The operation was stopped. After examination by the task team, the crane hook was moved up and the crane was placed in the parking area and impounded. There was evidence that all four trunnions received metal-to-metal contact from the down rods. A damage assessment is being conducted. There was no damage to the lifting device or Hydra-Set and no personnel were injured. Root cause: The root cause was determined to be human error caused by a combination of less than optimum design of the crane cab controls; inadequate communications and understanding of hoist speeds; and the failure of the emergency stop-button operator to actuate the emergency stop. | |
| language | English | |
| title | NASA-LLIS-1215 | num |
| title | Lessons Learned – Human factors considerations for critical hardware lifts | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 3 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1999 | |
| contenttype | fulltext | |
| subject keywords | Facilities | |
| subject keywords | Flight Equipment | |
| subject keywords | Flight Operations | |
| subject keywords | Ground Equipment | |
| subject keywords | Ground Operations | |
| subject keywords | Hardware | |
| subject keywords | Human Factors | |
| subject keywords | Industrial Operations | |
| subject keywords | Lifting Devices | |
| subject keywords | Policy & Planning | |
| subject keywords | Risk Management/Assessment | |
| subject keywords | Safety & Mission Assurance |

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