Show simple item record

Lessons Learned - Emergency Power-Down Procedures for Multiple Fuel Cells; Fuel Cell Helium Ingestion; Crew Module Fire Alarm and/or Electrical Component Activations; Vehicle Data Down Link

contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T15:06:32Z
date available2017-09-04T15:06:32Z
date copyright33567
date issued1991
identifier otherLEYCQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttps://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/4022
description abstractDescription of Driving Event:
Fuel cells are connected to the orbiter power busses via a motorized switch. OMI emergency procedures for powering down fuel cells assume redundant ground power is connected to the orbiter and calls for only one disconnect sequence fuel cell 1, 2, then 3. The power to disconnect the FC is delivered through the same busses they are being disconnected from. During a multiple fc failure (i.e. FC 2 & 3) with no ground power connected, the OMI requires FC 1 to be disconnected first. Since FC 1 was the only one operating correctly and suppling the busses with power, switching it off first removed the power needed to disconnect the rest.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-0041num
titleLessons Learned - Emergency Power-Down Procedures for Multiple Fuel Cells; Fuel Cell Helium Ingestion; Crew Module Fire Alarm and/or Electrical Component Activations; Vehicle Data Down Linken
typestandard
page3
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1991
contenttypefulltext
subject keywordsConfiguration Management
subject keywordsEnergetic Materials - Explosive/Propellant/Pyrotechnic
subject keywordsEnergy
subject keywordsGround Equipment
subject keywordsGround Operations
subject keywordsHardware
subject keywordsLaunch Vehicle


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record