DODD 5200.44
Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN)
Organization:
DODD - DoD Directives Service
Year: 2012
Abstract: PURPOSE. This Instruction, in accordance with the authorities in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 (Reference (a)) and DoDD 5144.1 (Reference (b)):
a. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to minimize the risk that DoD's warfighting mission capability will be impaired due to vulnerabilities in system design or sabotage or subversion of a system's mission critical functions or critical components, as defined in this Instruction, by foreign intelligence, terrorists, or other hostile elements.
b. Implements the DoD's TSN strategy, described in the Report on Trusted Defense Systems (Reference (c)) as the Strategy for Systems Assurance and Trustworthiness, through Program Protection and information assurance (IA) implementation to provide uncompromised weapons and information systems. The TSN strategy integrates robust systems engineering, supply chain risk management (SCRM), security, counterintelligence, intelligence, information assurance, hardware and software assurance, and information systems security engineering disciplines to manage risks to system integrity and trust.
c. Incorporates and cancels Directive-Type Memorandum 09-016 (Reference (d)).
d. Directs actions in accordance with the SCRM implementation strategy of National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (Reference (e)), section 806 of Public Law 111-383 (Reference (f)), DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.39 (Reference (g)), DoDD 5000.01 (Reference (h)), DoDI 5000.02 (Reference (i)), DoDD 8500.01E (Reference (j)), and Committee on National Security Systems Directive No. 505 (Reference (k)).
APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to:
a. OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
b. All DoD information systems and weapons systems that are or include systems described in subparagraphs 2.b.(1) through 2.b.(3) (hereinafter referred to collectively as "applicable systems"):
(1) National security systems as defined by section 3542 of title 44, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (l));
(2) Mission Assurance Category (MAC) I systems, as defined by Reference (j); or
(3) Other DoD information systems that the DoD Component's acquisition executive or chief information officer determines are critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions;
c. All mission critical functions and critical components within applicable systems identified through a criticality analysis. For the purposes of this Instruction, only information and communications technology (ICT) components in applicable systems shall be considered for the processes described herein until this Applicability section is modified in accordance with Enclosure 2, paragraph 1.f.
a. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to minimize the risk that DoD's warfighting mission capability will be impaired due to vulnerabilities in system design or sabotage or subversion of a system's mission critical functions or critical components, as defined in this Instruction, by foreign intelligence, terrorists, or other hostile elements.
b. Implements the DoD's TSN strategy, described in the Report on Trusted Defense Systems (Reference (c)) as the Strategy for Systems Assurance and Trustworthiness, through Program Protection and information assurance (IA) implementation to provide uncompromised weapons and information systems. The TSN strategy integrates robust systems engineering, supply chain risk management (SCRM), security, counterintelligence, intelligence, information assurance, hardware and software assurance, and information systems security engineering disciplines to manage risks to system integrity and trust.
c. Incorporates and cancels Directive-Type Memorandum 09-016 (Reference (d)).
d. Directs actions in accordance with the SCRM implementation strategy of National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (Reference (e)), section 806 of Public Law 111-383 (Reference (f)), DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.39 (Reference (g)), DoDD 5000.01 (Reference (h)), DoDI 5000.02 (Reference (i)), DoDD 8500.01E (Reference (j)), and Committee on National Security Systems Directive No. 505 (Reference (k)).
APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to:
a. OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
b. All DoD information systems and weapons systems that are or include systems described in subparagraphs 2.b.(1) through 2.b.(3) (hereinafter referred to collectively as "applicable systems"):
(1) National security systems as defined by section 3542 of title 44, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (l));
(2) Mission Assurance Category (MAC) I systems, as defined by Reference (j); or
(3) Other DoD information systems that the DoD Component's acquisition executive or chief information officer determines are critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions;
c. All mission critical functions and critical components within applicable systems identified through a criticality analysis. For the purposes of this Instruction, only information and communications technology (ICT) components in applicable systems shall be considered for the processes described herein until this Applicability section is modified in accordance with Enclosure 2, paragraph 1.f.
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| contributor author | DODD - DoD Directives Service | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T15:40:29Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T15:40:29Z | |
| date copyright | 41218 | |
| date issued | 2012 | |
| identifier other | PDZWAFAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | https://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/42713 | |
| description abstract | PURPOSE. This Instruction, in accordance with the authorities in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 (Reference (a)) and DoDD 5144.1 (Reference (b)): a. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to minimize the risk that DoD's warfighting mission capability will be impaired due to vulnerabilities in system design or sabotage or subversion of a system's mission critical functions or critical components, as defined in this Instruction, by foreign intelligence, terrorists, or other hostile elements. b. Implements the DoD's TSN strategy, described in the Report on Trusted Defense Systems (Reference (c)) as the Strategy for Systems Assurance and Trustworthiness, through Program Protection and information assurance (IA) implementation to provide uncompromised weapons and information systems. The TSN strategy integrates robust systems engineering, supply chain risk management (SCRM), security, counterintelligence, intelligence, information assurance, hardware and software assurance, and information systems security engineering disciplines to manage risks to system integrity and trust. c. Incorporates and cancels Directive-Type Memorandum 09-016 (Reference (d)). d. Directs actions in accordance with the SCRM implementation strategy of National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (Reference (e)), section 806 of Public Law 111-383 (Reference (f)), DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.39 (Reference (g)), DoDD 5000.01 (Reference (h)), DoDI 5000.02 (Reference (i)), DoDD 8500.01E (Reference (j)), and Committee on National Security Systems Directive No. 505 (Reference (k)). APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to: a. OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). b. All DoD information systems and weapons systems that are or include systems described in subparagraphs 2.b.(1) through 2.b.(3) (hereinafter referred to collectively as "applicable systems"): (1) National security systems as defined by section 3542 of title 44, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (l)); (2) Mission Assurance Category (MAC) I systems, as defined by Reference (j); or (3) Other DoD information systems that the DoD Component's acquisition executive or chief information officer determines are critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; c. All mission critical functions and critical components within applicable systems identified through a criticality analysis. For the purposes of this Instruction, only information and communications technology (ICT) components in applicable systems shall be considered for the processes described herein until this Applicability section is modified in accordance with Enclosure 2, paragraph 1.f. | |
| language | English | |
| title | DODD 5200.44 | num |
| title | Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN) | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 12 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | DODD - DoD Directives Service:;2012 | |
| contenttype | fulltext |

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