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NASA-LLIS-0196
Lessons Learned - Launch Processing Workload
Year: 1992
Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
An unusually high workload at the time of the STS 51-L ground processing caused manpower limitations, and some areas where particular skills were required, were in short supply. The major cause was the necessity of processing four orbiters, while also completing the launch complex 39B activation. Original planning called for OV-103 to be shipped to Vandenberg AFB in September 1985. The shipment was delayed in order to fly OV-103 on an additional flight from KSC. The need to delay the movement of OV-103, in turn, was caused by major work on OV-102 that had traveled to KSC. This resulted in a long processing flow prior to the STS 61-C launch. Problems in processing both orbiters were further increased by a substantial reliance on part cannibalization to support the operations. This was compounded by the STS 61-C activity, which was moved from a planned December 1985 launch to January 12, 1986. This unplanned delay, along with several intermediate launch attempts, created a higher than anticipated demand upon manpower, resulting in schedule limitations. In some skills, such as test conductors and senior engineers, the higher than normal test activities created abnormal demands upon their availability.
An unusually high workload at the time of the STS 51-L ground processing caused manpower limitations, and some areas where particular skills were required, were in short supply. The major cause was the necessity of processing four orbiters, while also completing the launch complex 39B activation. Original planning called for OV-103 to be shipped to Vandenberg AFB in September 1985. The shipment was delayed in order to fly OV-103 on an additional flight from KSC. The need to delay the movement of OV-103, in turn, was caused by major work on OV-102 that had traveled to KSC. This resulted in a long processing flow prior to the STS 61-C launch. Problems in processing both orbiters were further increased by a substantial reliance on part cannibalization to support the operations. This was compounded by the STS 61-C activity, which was moved from a planned December 1985 launch to January 12, 1986. This unplanned delay, along with several intermediate launch attempts, created a higher than anticipated demand upon manpower, resulting in schedule limitations. In some skills, such as test conductors and senior engineers, the higher than normal test activities created abnormal demands upon their availability.
Subject: Administration/Organization
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| contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T15:41:30Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T15:41:30Z | |
| date copyright | 33912 | |
| date issued | 1992 | |
| identifier other | PGZCQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | https://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/43815 | |
| description abstract | Description of Driving Event: An unusually high workload at the time of the STS 51-L ground processing caused manpower limitations, and some areas where particular skills were required, were in short supply. The major cause was the necessity of processing four orbiters, while also completing the launch complex 39B activation. Original planning called for OV-103 to be shipped to Vandenberg AFB in September 1985. The shipment was delayed in order to fly OV-103 on an additional flight from KSC. The need to delay the movement of OV-103, in turn, was caused by major work on OV-102 that had traveled to KSC. This resulted in a long processing flow prior to the STS 61-C launch. Problems in processing both orbiters were further increased by a substantial reliance on part cannibalization to support the operations. This was compounded by the STS 61-C activity, which was moved from a planned December 1985 launch to January 12, 1986. This unplanned delay, along with several intermediate launch attempts, created a higher than anticipated demand upon manpower, resulting in schedule limitations. In some skills, such as test conductors and senior engineers, the higher than normal test activities created abnormal demands upon their availability. | |
| language | English | |
| title | NASA-LLIS-0196 | num |
| title | Lessons Learned - Launch Processing Workload | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 2 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1992 | |
| contenttype | fulltext | |
| subject keywords | Administration/Organization | |
| subject keywords | Ground Operations | |
| subject keywords | Human Resources & Education |