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NASA-LLIS-1035

Lessons Learned – Mars 2001 Risk Reduction Testing, Pyrovalve

Organization:
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Year: 2001

Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
A new low blow-by pyrovalve was used in place of a high blow-by pyrovalve primarily to avoid the possibility of a pyrotechnic-induced propellant explosion in a newly designed propulsion system. During blow-by testing of the new valves, one valve did not cycle when commanded. Failure analysis indicated that both initiators and the booster had fired, yet the valve did not cycle. Further investigation indicated that the booster charge was expelled from the Primer Chamber Assembly down into the ram bore. This prevented the booster can surface from opening properly (petaling) and some of the booster energy was diverted to expanding the booster can rather than fully transmitting the energy to the ram. As a result, the diminished energy transferred to the ram was inadequate to shear the tube section that opened the valve. The valve manufacturer improved booster retention by increasing an aluminum retention ring diameter to be slightly larger than the ram bore and improved the potting between the booster and housing. This improved valve configuration was then procured by the program and evaluated by typical lot acceptance testing.
Subsequent testing and analysis indicated that the potting bond was not consistent, and that the booster retention ring could possibly deform, allowing displacement of the booster into the ram bore. The risk of a flight valve failing was low but still unacceptable to the project because the vehicle did not have redundant pyrovalves.
The retention washer material was changed to a high strength stainless steel and the outside diameter was further increased. The potting process was also improved to form a better gas seal. Testing indicated the reliability risk had been successfully mitigated.
URI: https://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/45597
Subject: Energetic Materials - Explosive/Propellant/Pyrotechnic
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    NASA-LLIS-1035

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contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T15:43:21Z
date available2017-09-04T15:43:21Z
date copyright08/17/2001
date issued2001
identifier otherPLUEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttps://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/45597
description abstractDescription of Driving Event:
A new low blow-by pyrovalve was used in place of a high blow-by pyrovalve primarily to avoid the possibility of a pyrotechnic-induced propellant explosion in a newly designed propulsion system. During blow-by testing of the new valves, one valve did not cycle when commanded. Failure analysis indicated that both initiators and the booster had fired, yet the valve did not cycle. Further investigation indicated that the booster charge was expelled from the Primer Chamber Assembly down into the ram bore. This prevented the booster can surface from opening properly (petaling) and some of the booster energy was diverted to expanding the booster can rather than fully transmitting the energy to the ram. As a result, the diminished energy transferred to the ram was inadequate to shear the tube section that opened the valve. The valve manufacturer improved booster retention by increasing an aluminum retention ring diameter to be slightly larger than the ram bore and improved the potting between the booster and housing. This improved valve configuration was then procured by the program and evaluated by typical lot acceptance testing.
Subsequent testing and analysis indicated that the potting bond was not consistent, and that the booster retention ring could possibly deform, allowing displacement of the booster into the ram bore. The risk of a flight valve failing was low but still unacceptable to the project because the vehicle did not have redundant pyrovalves.
The retention washer material was changed to a high strength stainless steel and the outside diameter was further increased. The potting process was also improved to form a better gas seal. Testing indicated the reliability risk had been successfully mitigated.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-1035num
titleLessons Learned – Mars 2001 Risk Reduction Testing, Pyrovalveen
typestandard
page3
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;2001
contenttypefulltext
subject keywordsEnergetic Materials - Explosive/Propellant/Pyrotechnic
subject keywordsFlight Equipment
subject keywordsHardware
subject keywordsParts Materials & Processes
subject keywordsRisk Management/Assessment
subject keywordsTest & Verification
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DSpace software copyright © 2017-2020  DuraSpace
نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
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