NATO AJP-3.15(B)

Abstract

A C-IED approach will require co-operation between nations and within governments, it is a comprehensive approach that is joint, interagency and multinational. This publication will consider some of the wider aspects of C-IED, concentrating on the military contribution within the land environment. However, C-IED is not solely an activity within the land component. For example the C-IED approach at the tactical level supports the maritime component (e.g. amphibious actions on the land, or protecting ships within harbours from attack) and the air component (e.g. by contributing to maintaining airfield security). <br><strong>Purpose.</strong> The purpose of Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.15(A) <em>Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering-Improvised Explosive Devices</em> (C-IED) is to provide Allied joint operations with a useful framework and guidance for the approach known as C-IED. This publication is intended to guide operational commanders and staff. It will address the roles, links and responsibilities from the tactical, operational and strategic commands and the political guidance and oversight inherent in this process. <br>A C-IED approach is necessary since the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is an expected feature of future warfare and countering IEDs is a major feature of the stabilisation¹ and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations that currently occupy the Alliance. However, the C-IED approach described in this publication is not an end in itself. The doctrine will emphasize the inextricable relationship that exists between the C-IED approach, stabilisation and COIN operations. The C-IED approach is a strand of activity for delivering security and stability which is supportive and consistent with the wider aims of stabilisation and COIN. As such this doctrine will draw heavily upon AJP-3.4.4 <em>Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency</em> (COIN) and a doctrine for stabilization and reconstruction still to be developed and aims to be coherent and complementary to it. <br>IEDs are one of the weapons of choice for an opponent who seeks an asymmetric advantage to avoid fighting against our conventional strengths. The adversary will exploit his use of IEDs to demonstrate the force's failings to deliver security and IEDs will inhibit our freedom to manoeuvre. For the local population IEDs can lead to widespread feelings of insecurity with a debilitating effect on the host nation population, potentially resulting in a loss of confidence and support for alliance activity. IED casualties also affect morale and consequently the cohesion and effectiveness of the force. Crucially, the force's national domestic support may be eroded. Consequently, IEDs employed by an adversary as a tactical weapon can have strategic effect. A C-IED approach is a strand of activity that will deny an adversary his intentions through his use of IEDs. Additionally, much of the C-IED approach could be adapted to counter other adversary asymmetric threats. <br>¹ This publication uses the UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution definition for stabilisation which is the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence, protect the population and key infrastructure, promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power, and prepares for sustainable social and economic development.