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NASA-LLIS-0623
Lessons Learned – Tethered Satellite System De-integration Process Lesson Learned
Year: 1999
Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
The Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Satellite Support Assembly (SAA) was inadvertently scheduled for delivery to the Florida Space Institute prior to de-integration of live ordnance. The scheduled delivery resulted from a request for donation of the SAA following utilization of TSS on STS-75. During offload operations of the SAA at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAS), a technician recognized six NASA Standard Initiators (NSI's) still installed on the hardware. The NSI's were all examined and determined to be "live" category B ordnance with Faraday caps installed. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel then removed the six devices for proper disposition. The remainder of the satellite equipment was subsequently closely examined to verify there were no other hazards. No personnel were exposed to the live NSI's. The event was classified as a "Close Call" and entered into the Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) database for review and implementation of corrective action(s). The cause of this incident was determined to be inadequate configuration control of flight hardware during the de-integration process. This resulted in a loss of accountability for hazardous items integral to the design. This is a situation particular to flight hardware not scheduled for re-flight. Hardware scheduled for re-flight (unlike TSS) possess adequate configuration control of hazardous items.
The Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Satellite Support Assembly (SAA) was inadvertently scheduled for delivery to the Florida Space Institute prior to de-integration of live ordnance. The scheduled delivery resulted from a request for donation of the SAA following utilization of TSS on STS-75. During offload operations of the SAA at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAS), a technician recognized six NASA Standard Initiators (NSI's) still installed on the hardware. The NSI's were all examined and determined to be "live" category B ordnance with Faraday caps installed. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel then removed the six devices for proper disposition. The remainder of the satellite equipment was subsequently closely examined to verify there were no other hazards. No personnel were exposed to the live NSI's. The event was classified as a "Close Call" and entered into the Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) database for review and implementation of corrective action(s). The cause of this incident was determined to be inadequate configuration control of flight hardware during the de-integration process. This resulted in a loss of accountability for hazardous items integral to the design. This is a situation particular to flight hardware not scheduled for re-flight. Hardware scheduled for re-flight (unlike TSS) possess adequate configuration control of hazardous items.
Subject: Configuration Management
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| contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T17:16:30Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T17:16:30Z | |
| date copyright | 06/02/1999 | |
| date issued | 1999 | |
| identifier other | ZGCEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | http://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/139971 | |
| description abstract | Description of Driving Event: The Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Satellite Support Assembly (SAA) was inadvertently scheduled for delivery to the Florida Space Institute prior to de-integration of live ordnance. The scheduled delivery resulted from a request for donation of the SAA following utilization of TSS on STS-75. During offload operations of the SAA at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAS), a technician recognized six NASA Standard Initiators (NSI's) still installed on the hardware. The NSI's were all examined and determined to be "live" category B ordnance with Faraday caps installed. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel then removed the six devices for proper disposition. The remainder of the satellite equipment was subsequently closely examined to verify there were no other hazards. No personnel were exposed to the live NSI's. The event was classified as a "Close Call" and entered into the Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) database for review and implementation of corrective action(s). The cause of this incident was determined to be inadequate configuration control of flight hardware during the de-integration process. This resulted in a loss of accountability for hazardous items integral to the design. This is a situation particular to flight hardware not scheduled for re-flight. Hardware scheduled for re-flight (unlike TSS) possess adequate configuration control of hazardous items. | |
| language | English | |
| title | NASA-LLIS-0623 | num |
| title | Lessons Learned – Tethered Satellite System De-integration Process Lesson Learned | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 2 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1999 | |
| contenttype | fulltext | |
| subject keywords | Configuration Management | |
| subject keywords | Energetic Materials - Explosive/Propellant/Pyrotechnic | |
| subject keywords | Explosives Handling | |
| subject keywords | Flight Equipment |