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NASA-LLIS-1224
Lessons Learned - "Deconfiguration" Prevention
Year: 1998
Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
During processing of flight 2A element at the KSC SSPF, hardware that had previously been configured for test or closed out for flight was inadvertently deconfigured / disassembled by teams working parallel tasks on the same system or hardware.
An assembly or test team working to an approved work authorization document (WAD) would configure a system or hardware for an upcoming test or for flight. Later, a different assembly or test team, also working to a valid work document, would dissemble or reconfigure that hardware for a different task. This at times caused a loss of known configuration, which necessitated the release of unplanned event paperwork to document the restoration of the hardware to its original state of completion, and caused delays to already tight schedules.
Example: Inter-module ventilation (IMV) port caps had been configured for flight (installed and leak tested). The team testing the IMV/ECLSS system, needing to connect air ducting to these ports, removed the caps and proceeded with their tasks, negating the previously certified hardware configuration.
Root cause: Element processing schedule compression and overlapping assembly and test activities resulted in procedural and schedule disconnects.
During processing of flight 2A element at the KSC SSPF, hardware that had previously been configured for test or closed out for flight was inadvertently deconfigured / disassembled by teams working parallel tasks on the same system or hardware.
An assembly or test team working to an approved work authorization document (WAD) would configure a system or hardware for an upcoming test or for flight. Later, a different assembly or test team, also working to a valid work document, would dissemble or reconfigure that hardware for a different task. This at times caused a loss of known configuration, which necessitated the release of unplanned event paperwork to document the restoration of the hardware to its original state of completion, and caused delays to already tight schedules.
Example: Inter-module ventilation (IMV) port caps had been configured for flight (installed and leak tested). The team testing the IMV/ECLSS system, needing to connect air ducting to these ports, removed the caps and proceeded with their tasks, negating the previously certified hardware configuration.
Root cause: Element processing schedule compression and overlapping assembly and test activities resulted in procedural and schedule disconnects.
Subject: Administration/Organization
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| contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T17:17:18Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T17:17:18Z | |
| date copyright | 09/11/1998 | |
| date issued | 1998 | |
| identifier other | ZHVEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | http://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/140647 | |
| description abstract | Description of Driving Event: During processing of flight 2A element at the KSC SSPF, hardware that had previously been configured for test or closed out for flight was inadvertently deconfigured / disassembled by teams working parallel tasks on the same system or hardware. An assembly or test team working to an approved work authorization document (WAD) would configure a system or hardware for an upcoming test or for flight. Later, a different assembly or test team, also working to a valid work document, would dissemble or reconfigure that hardware for a different task. This at times caused a loss of known configuration, which necessitated the release of unplanned event paperwork to document the restoration of the hardware to its original state of completion, and caused delays to already tight schedules. Example: Inter-module ventilation (IMV) port caps had been configured for flight (installed and leak tested). The team testing the IMV/ECLSS system, needing to connect air ducting to these ports, removed the caps and proceeded with their tasks, negating the previously certified hardware configuration. Root cause: Element processing schedule compression and overlapping assembly and test activities resulted in procedural and schedule disconnects. | |
| language | English | |
| title | NASA-LLIS-1224 | num |
| title | Lessons Learned - "Deconfiguration" Prevention | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 3 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1998 | |
| contenttype | fulltext | |
| subject keywords | Administration/Organization | |
| subject keywords | Configuration Management | |
| subject keywords | Ground Operations | |
| subject keywords | Policy & Planning | |
| subject keywords | Safety & Mission Assurance | |
| subject keywords | Test & Verification |