• 0
    • ارسال درخواست
    • حذف همه
    • Industrial Standards
    • Defence Standards
  • درباره ما
  • درخواست موردی
  • فهرست استانداردها
    • Industrial Standards
    • Defence Standards
  • راهنما
  • Login
  • لیست خرید شما 0
    • ارسال درخواست
    • حذف همه
View Item 
  •   YSE
  • Defence Standards
  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
  • View Item
  •   YSE
  • Defence Standards
  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
  • View Item
  • All Fields
  • Title(or Doc Num)
  • Organization
  • Year
  • Subject
Advanced Search
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Archive

NASA-LLIS-1182

Lessons Learned - Atlantis Fuel Cell Mishap Investigation Board Report - April 4, 1990

Organization:
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Year: 1990

Abstract: Description of Driving Event:
On April 4, 1990, at approximately 9:05 a.m. EDT, one of the three fuel cells (#3) installed in the Orbiter Atlantis, OV-104, was damaged while an attempt was being made to vent the fuel cell prior to its removal and replacement. Atlantis returned to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on March 3, 1990, after successfully completing the STS-36 mission. The vehicle was undergoing processing in the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) in preparation for the STS-38 mission in July of this year. Testing and processing was being accomplished by the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) at KSC. The Fuel Cell Single Cell Voltage Test was accomplished on March 30 and 31, and the analysis of the test results indicated there were two degraded internal cells. A decision to remove and replace the fuel cell was subsequently made on April 2 by the Orbiter Project Manager.
The accident occurred while attempting to vent the fuel cell with the Orbiter hydrogen (H 2) purge vent port capped. This allowed the H2 pressure to exceed the oxygen (02) pressure in the fuel cell, 2 side of the fuel cell. The Potassium Hydroxide (KOH) was found at the 02 purge port of the fuel cell indicating the ninety-six internal cells, the regulator, and the accumulator would have to be replaced due to the corrosive qualities of KOH. No one was injured and damage was limited to fuel cell #3.
URI: http://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/144612
Subject: Configuration Management
Collections :
  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
  • Download PDF : (29.13Kb)
  • Show Full MetaData Hide Full MetaData
  • Statistics

    NASA-LLIS-1182

Show full item record

contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T17:21:24Z
date available2017-09-04T17:21:24Z
date copyright04/04/1990
date issued1990
identifier otherCCVEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttp://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/144612
description abstractDescription of Driving Event:
On April 4, 1990, at approximately 9:05 a.m. EDT, one of the three fuel cells (#3) installed in the Orbiter Atlantis, OV-104, was damaged while an attempt was being made to vent the fuel cell prior to its removal and replacement. Atlantis returned to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on March 3, 1990, after successfully completing the STS-36 mission. The vehicle was undergoing processing in the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) in preparation for the STS-38 mission in July of this year. Testing and processing was being accomplished by the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) at KSC. The Fuel Cell Single Cell Voltage Test was accomplished on March 30 and 31, and the analysis of the test results indicated there were two degraded internal cells. A decision to remove and replace the fuel cell was subsequently made on April 2 by the Orbiter Project Manager.
The accident occurred while attempting to vent the fuel cell with the Orbiter hydrogen (H 2) purge vent port capped. This allowed the H2 pressure to exceed the oxygen (02) pressure in the fuel cell, 2 side of the fuel cell. The Potassium Hydroxide (KOH) was found at the 02 purge port of the fuel cell indicating the ninety-six internal cells, the regulator, and the accumulator would have to be replaced due to the corrosive qualities of KOH. No one was injured and damage was limited to fuel cell #3.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-1182num
titleLessons Learned - Atlantis Fuel Cell Mishap Investigation Board Report - April 4, 1990en
typestandard
page9
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1990
contenttypefulltext
subject keywordsConfiguration Management
subject keywordsCryogenic Systems
subject keywordsEnergetic Materials - Explosive/Propellant/Pyrotechnic
subject keywordsEnergy
subject keywordsFlight Equipment
subject keywordsFlight Operations
subject keywordsGround Equipment
subject keywordsGround Operations
subject keywordsHardware
subject keywordsHuman Factors
subject keywordsLaunch Process
subject keywordsLifting Devices
subject keywordsLogistics
subject keywordsMishap Reporting
subject keywordsSpacecraft
DSpace software copyright © 2017-2020  DuraSpace
نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
yabeshDSpacePersian
 
DSpace software copyright © 2017-2020  DuraSpace
نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
yabeshDSpacePersian