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NASA-LLIS-0559

Lessons Learned – Redundant Verification of Critical Command Timing (1995)

Organization:
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Year: 1997

Abstract: Abstract:
When a new mission software release was uploaded to the spacecraft, the inflight upload failed to include a software patch that had been written to fix a defective countdown timer. Because an independent "watchdog timer" was planned, but never implemented due to constrained project resources, the thrusters continued to fire after the desired shutdown time and the mission was terminated. Recommendations centered on the need for rigorous software configuration management, a watchdog timer to terminate operations, and testbed verification of in-flight software updates.
URI: http://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/175286
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  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
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    NASA-LLIS-0559

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contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T17:52:04Z
date available2017-09-04T17:52:04Z
date copyright05/29/1997
date issued1997
identifier otherFBCEQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttp://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/175286
description abstractAbstract:
When a new mission software release was uploaded to the spacecraft, the inflight upload failed to include a software patch that had been written to fix a defective countdown timer. Because an independent "watchdog timer" was planned, but never implemented due to constrained project resources, the thrusters continued to fire after the desired shutdown time and the mission was terminated. Recommendations centered on the need for rigorous software configuration management, a watchdog timer to terminate operations, and testbed verification of in-flight software updates.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-0559num
titleLessons Learned – Redundant Verification of Critical Command Timing (1995)en
typestandard
page3
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;1997
contenttypefulltext
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DSpace software copyright © 2017-2020  DuraSpace
نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
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