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MIL-STD-1822A
NUCLEAR COMPATIBILITY CERTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS, SUBSYSTEMS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Organization:
AIR FORCE - 19 - Space and Missile Systems Center
Year: 2013
Abstract: General
This document describes standard practices for nuclear compatibility certification of nuclear weapon systems (excluding nuclear facilities). Nuclear weapon system compatibility certification authority is derived from the 1953 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)/Department of Defense (DoD) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and restated within numerous DoD and Air Force (AF) directives.
a. The mission of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) is to ensure safe, secure, reliable nuclear weapon systems are available to support the National Command Structure and the AF war-fighter. By definition, "nuclear surety" encompasses all aspects of nuclear weapon system safety, reliability, and security. A basic pillar supporting the Air Force's nuclear surety program is the Air Force's Nuclear Certification Program managed by the AFNWC.
b. The Air Force Nuclear Certification Program, defined in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63- 125, Nuclear Certification Program, ensures all procedures, software, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations are certified before conducting nuclear operations with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems. Nuclear Certification occurs when a determination is made by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center's Commander that: procedures, software, equipment, and facilities are sufficient to perform nuclear weapon functions, and personnel and organizations are capable of performing assigned nuclear missions. Nuclear Certification is a part of Operational Safety, Suitability & Effectiveness (OSS&E) as directed by AFI 63-1201, Life Cycle Systems Engineering.
c. The Air Force Nuclear Certification Process is described in detail in AFI 63-125. Major elements of nuclear certification are: design certification, and operational certification. Components of design certification are: compatibility certification, nuclear safety design certification, safety rules development, and technical order certification. Although all components of design certification are closely related and arguably difficult to totally separate this document will focus on nuclear compatibility certification.
d. The Nuclear Weapon System Compatibility is the capability of two or more nuclear weapon system components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. Nuclear weapon system compatibility evaluations are a component of Operational Suitability as established in AFI 63-1201. Nuclear weapon system operational suitability is a measure of the degree to which a nuclear weapon system or end-item can be placed satisfactorily into field use with consideration given to availability, compatibility, transportation, interoperability, and reliability. A successful nuclear weapon system compatibility evaluation (and subsequent Nuclear Compatibility Certification Statement [NCCS]) is a component of the Air Force's Nuclear Weapon System Certification and Systems Engineering processes.
e. Nuclear safety design certification requirements are closely related to compatibility requirements. They are described in detail in AFMAN 91-118, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems, and AFMAN 91-119, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software, and are not repeated here.
f. According to DODD 3150.02, section 4.2.8, "Nuclear weapon system safety, security, survivability, and use control are interrelated. Decisions concerning one should not be made without consideration of the effect of those decisions on the others." Survivable nuclear weapons need survivable support equipment. To address the interrelation of survivability with safety and security, AFNWC established the Nuclear Capabilities Analysis (NCA) division, which provides scientific oversight of the RN part of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) survivability mission. NCA monitors development and modification of nuclear weapons, their components, or subassemblies for compliance with Military Characteristics and Stockpile To Target Sequence survivability requirements.
Purpose.
This military standard identifies the tasks, analyses and tests that are necessary to assure compatibility between National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) developed nuclear weapons and DoD operational nuclear weapon delivery systems and support equipment. Requirements for evaluation and reporting for nuclear compatibility certification are also delineated.
Applicability.
This document applies to AF nuclear weapon systems. Modified portions of nuclear weapon systems will also comply with this document. This document complements AFI 63-125.
Application and tailoring guidance.
Applying requirements.
Requirements described in this military standard are to be applied in Air Force nuclear weapon system procurements, requests for proposals, statements of work and U.S. Government inhouse developments requiring nuclear certification programs for the development and sustainment of weapon systems. Although this military standard provides specific nuclear compatibility certification requirements, it may be necessary to tailor this military standard to accommodate unique characteristics of a particular weapon system.
Tailoring of requirements.
Requirements are to be tailored by the engineering organization as required by governing documents and as appropriate to particular systems or equipment depending on the program type, magnitude, and funding. In tailoring the requirements, the detail and depth of the effort is defined by the managing engineering organization and incorporated in the appropriate contractual documents. Also, each program will specify which requirements in this military standard are applicable and binding for their specific system design.
Application guidance to the procuring agency.
All proposed tailoring and rationale for modifying requirements of this military standard to address unique aspects of the weapon system must be reviewed and approved by the AFNWC/NCS.Intended Use: This document is intended for use in the procurement or modification of Air Force nuclear weapon systems, subsystems and support equipment.
This document describes standard practices for nuclear compatibility certification of nuclear weapon systems (excluding nuclear facilities). Nuclear weapon system compatibility certification authority is derived from the 1953 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)/Department of Defense (DoD) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and restated within numerous DoD and Air Force (AF) directives.
a. The mission of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) is to ensure safe, secure, reliable nuclear weapon systems are available to support the National Command Structure and the AF war-fighter. By definition, "nuclear surety" encompasses all aspects of nuclear weapon system safety, reliability, and security. A basic pillar supporting the Air Force's nuclear surety program is the Air Force's Nuclear Certification Program managed by the AFNWC.
b. The Air Force Nuclear Certification Program, defined in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63- 125, Nuclear Certification Program, ensures all procedures, software, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations are certified before conducting nuclear operations with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems. Nuclear Certification occurs when a determination is made by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center's Commander that: procedures, software, equipment, and facilities are sufficient to perform nuclear weapon functions, and personnel and organizations are capable of performing assigned nuclear missions. Nuclear Certification is a part of Operational Safety, Suitability & Effectiveness (OSS&E) as directed by AFI 63-1201, Life Cycle Systems Engineering.
c. The Air Force Nuclear Certification Process is described in detail in AFI 63-125. Major elements of nuclear certification are: design certification, and operational certification. Components of design certification are: compatibility certification, nuclear safety design certification, safety rules development, and technical order certification. Although all components of design certification are closely related and arguably difficult to totally separate this document will focus on nuclear compatibility certification.
d. The Nuclear Weapon System Compatibility is the capability of two or more nuclear weapon system components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. Nuclear weapon system compatibility evaluations are a component of Operational Suitability as established in AFI 63-1201. Nuclear weapon system operational suitability is a measure of the degree to which a nuclear weapon system or end-item can be placed satisfactorily into field use with consideration given to availability, compatibility, transportation, interoperability, and reliability. A successful nuclear weapon system compatibility evaluation (and subsequent Nuclear Compatibility Certification Statement [NCCS]) is a component of the Air Force's Nuclear Weapon System Certification and Systems Engineering processes.
e. Nuclear safety design certification requirements are closely related to compatibility requirements. They are described in detail in AFMAN 91-118, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems, and AFMAN 91-119, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software, and are not repeated here.
f. According to DODD 3150.02, section 4.2.8, "Nuclear weapon system safety, security, survivability, and use control are interrelated. Decisions concerning one should not be made without consideration of the effect of those decisions on the others." Survivable nuclear weapons need survivable support equipment. To address the interrelation of survivability with safety and security, AFNWC established the Nuclear Capabilities Analysis (NCA) division, which provides scientific oversight of the RN part of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) survivability mission. NCA monitors development and modification of nuclear weapons, their components, or subassemblies for compliance with Military Characteristics and Stockpile To Target Sequence survivability requirements.
Purpose.
This military standard identifies the tasks, analyses and tests that are necessary to assure compatibility between National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) developed nuclear weapons and DoD operational nuclear weapon delivery systems and support equipment. Requirements for evaluation and reporting for nuclear compatibility certification are also delineated.
Applicability.
This document applies to AF nuclear weapon systems. Modified portions of nuclear weapon systems will also comply with this document. This document complements AFI 63-125.
Application and tailoring guidance.
Applying requirements.
Requirements described in this military standard are to be applied in Air Force nuclear weapon system procurements, requests for proposals, statements of work and U.S. Government inhouse developments requiring nuclear certification programs for the development and sustainment of weapon systems. Although this military standard provides specific nuclear compatibility certification requirements, it may be necessary to tailor this military standard to accommodate unique characteristics of a particular weapon system.
Tailoring of requirements.
Requirements are to be tailored by the engineering organization as required by governing documents and as appropriate to particular systems or equipment depending on the program type, magnitude, and funding. In tailoring the requirements, the detail and depth of the effort is defined by the managing engineering organization and incorporated in the appropriate contractual documents. Also, each program will specify which requirements in this military standard are applicable and binding for their specific system design.
Application guidance to the procuring agency.
All proposed tailoring and rationale for modifying requirements of this military standard to address unique aspects of the weapon system must be reviewed and approved by the AFNWC/NCS.Intended Use: This document is intended for use in the procurement or modification of Air Force nuclear weapon systems, subsystems and support equipment.
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| contributor author | AIR FORCE - 19 - Space and Missile Systems Center | |
| date accessioned | 2017-09-04T15:38:15Z | |
| date available | 2017-09-04T15:38:15Z | |
| date copyright | 02/01/2013 | |
| date issued | 2013 | |
| identifier other | OXPTBFAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
| identifier uri | http://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/40315 | |
| description abstract | General This document describes standard practices for nuclear compatibility certification of nuclear weapon systems (excluding nuclear facilities). Nuclear weapon system compatibility certification authority is derived from the 1953 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)/Department of Defense (DoD) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and restated within numerous DoD and Air Force (AF) directives. a. The mission of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) is to ensure safe, secure, reliable nuclear weapon systems are available to support the National Command Structure and the AF war-fighter. By definition, "nuclear surety" encompasses all aspects of nuclear weapon system safety, reliability, and security. A basic pillar supporting the Air Force's nuclear surety program is the Air Force's Nuclear Certification Program managed by the AFNWC. b. The Air Force Nuclear Certification Program, defined in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63- 125, Nuclear Certification Program, ensures all procedures, software, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations are certified before conducting nuclear operations with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems. Nuclear Certification occurs when a determination is made by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center's Commander that: procedures, software, equipment, and facilities are sufficient to perform nuclear weapon functions, and personnel and organizations are capable of performing assigned nuclear missions. Nuclear Certification is a part of Operational Safety, Suitability & Effectiveness (OSS&E) as directed by AFI 63-1201, Life Cycle Systems Engineering. c. The Air Force Nuclear Certification Process is described in detail in AFI 63-125. Major elements of nuclear certification are: design certification, and operational certification. Components of design certification are: compatibility certification, nuclear safety design certification, safety rules development, and technical order certification. Although all components of design certification are closely related and arguably difficult to totally separate this document will focus on nuclear compatibility certification. d. The Nuclear Weapon System Compatibility is the capability of two or more nuclear weapon system components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. Nuclear weapon system compatibility evaluations are a component of Operational Suitability as established in AFI 63-1201. Nuclear weapon system operational suitability is a measure of the degree to which a nuclear weapon system or end-item can be placed satisfactorily into field use with consideration given to availability, compatibility, transportation, interoperability, and reliability. A successful nuclear weapon system compatibility evaluation (and subsequent Nuclear Compatibility Certification Statement [NCCS]) is a component of the Air Force's Nuclear Weapon System Certification and Systems Engineering processes. e. Nuclear safety design certification requirements are closely related to compatibility requirements. They are described in detail in AFMAN 91-118, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems, and AFMAN 91-119, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software, and are not repeated here. f. According to DODD 3150.02, section 4.2.8, "Nuclear weapon system safety, security, survivability, and use control are interrelated. Decisions concerning one should not be made without consideration of the effect of those decisions on the others." Survivable nuclear weapons need survivable support equipment. To address the interrelation of survivability with safety and security, AFNWC established the Nuclear Capabilities Analysis (NCA) division, which provides scientific oversight of the RN part of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) survivability mission. NCA monitors development and modification of nuclear weapons, their components, or subassemblies for compliance with Military Characteristics and Stockpile To Target Sequence survivability requirements. Purpose. This military standard identifies the tasks, analyses and tests that are necessary to assure compatibility between National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) developed nuclear weapons and DoD operational nuclear weapon delivery systems and support equipment. Requirements for evaluation and reporting for nuclear compatibility certification are also delineated. Applicability. This document applies to AF nuclear weapon systems. Modified portions of nuclear weapon systems will also comply with this document. This document complements AFI 63-125. Application and tailoring guidance. Applying requirements. Requirements described in this military standard are to be applied in Air Force nuclear weapon system procurements, requests for proposals, statements of work and U.S. Government inhouse developments requiring nuclear certification programs for the development and sustainment of weapon systems. Although this military standard provides specific nuclear compatibility certification requirements, it may be necessary to tailor this military standard to accommodate unique characteristics of a particular weapon system. Tailoring of requirements. Requirements are to be tailored by the engineering organization as required by governing documents and as appropriate to particular systems or equipment depending on the program type, magnitude, and funding. In tailoring the requirements, the detail and depth of the effort is defined by the managing engineering organization and incorporated in the appropriate contractual documents. Also, each program will specify which requirements in this military standard are applicable and binding for their specific system design. Application guidance to the procuring agency. All proposed tailoring and rationale for modifying requirements of this military standard to address unique aspects of the weapon system must be reviewed and approved by the AFNWC/NCS.Intended Use: This document is intended for use in the procurement or modification of Air Force nuclear weapon systems, subsystems and support equipment. | |
| language | English | |
| title | MIL-STD-1822A | num |
| title | NUCLEAR COMPATIBILITY CERTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS, SUBSYSTEMS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | en |
| type | standard | |
| page | 57 | |
| status | Active | |
| tree | AIR FORCE - 19 - Space and Missile Systems Center:;2013 | |
| contenttype | fulltext |