NASA-LLIS-1799
Lessons Learned – Erroneous Onboard Status Reporting Disabled IMAGE's Radio
Year: 2007
Abstract: Abstract:
The loss of the IMAGE satellite was attributed to a Single Event Upset-induced "instant trip" of the Solid State Power Controller (SSPC) that supplies power to the single-string Transponder. The circuit breaker was not reset because this hybrid device incorrectly reported the circuit breaker as closed, and ground could not command a reset because the satellite\'s single telemetry receiver had been disabled by the SSPC. The SSPC\'s problematic state reporting characteristic was an intentional design feature that was not reflected in any part documentation, and three similar "instant trips" on other NASA satellites had not been reported in the GIDEP system. Consider hardwiring receiver power to the power bus, or build redundancy into the power switching or into the operational status sensing. Ensure that GIDEP reports or NASA Alerts are written and routed to mission operations (as well as to hardware developers), and that flight software responds to command loss with a set of timed spacecraft-level fault responses.
The loss of the IMAGE satellite was attributed to a Single Event Upset-induced "instant trip" of the Solid State Power Controller (SSPC) that supplies power to the single-string Transponder. The circuit breaker was not reset because this hybrid device incorrectly reported the circuit breaker as closed, and ground could not command a reset because the satellite\'s single telemetry receiver had been disabled by the SSPC. The SSPC\'s problematic state reporting characteristic was an intentional design feature that was not reflected in any part documentation, and three similar "instant trips" on other NASA satellites had not been reported in the GIDEP system. Consider hardwiring receiver power to the power bus, or build redundancy into the power switching or into the operational status sensing. Ensure that GIDEP reports or NASA Alerts are written and routed to mission operations (as well as to hardware developers), and that flight software responds to command loss with a set of timed spacecraft-level fault responses.
Subject: Additional Categories.Communication Systems
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contributor author | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) | |
date accessioned | 2017-09-04T15:43:23Z | |
date available | 2017-09-04T15:43:23Z | |
date copyright | 2007.07.10 | |
date issued | 2007 | |
identifier other | PLYCQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf | |
identifier uri | http://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/45649 | |
description abstract | Abstract: The loss of the IMAGE satellite was attributed to a Single Event Upset-induced "instant trip" of the Solid State Power Controller (SSPC) that supplies power to the single-string Transponder. The circuit breaker was not reset because this hybrid device incorrectly reported the circuit breaker as closed, and ground could not command a reset because the satellite\'s single telemetry receiver had been disabled by the SSPC. The SSPC\'s problematic state reporting characteristic was an intentional design feature that was not reflected in any part documentation, and three similar "instant trips" on other NASA satellites had not been reported in the GIDEP system. Consider hardwiring receiver power to the power bus, or build redundancy into the power switching or into the operational status sensing. Ensure that GIDEP reports or NASA Alerts are written and routed to mission operations (as well as to hardware developers), and that flight software responds to command loss with a set of timed spacecraft-level fault responses. | |
language | English | |
title | NASA-LLIS-1799 | num |
title | Lessons Learned – Erroneous Onboard Status Reporting Disabled IMAGE's Radio | en |
type | standard | |
page | 5 | |
status | Active | |
tree | NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;2007 | |
contenttype | fulltext | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Communication Systems | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Computers | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Flight Equipment | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Flight Operations | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Hardware | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Information Technology/Systems | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Mishap Reporting | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Parts | |
subject keywords | Materials | |
subject keywords | & Processes | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Safety & Mission Assurance | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Software | |
subject keywords | Additional Categories.Spacecraft | |
subject keywords | Engineering Design (Phase C/D). | |
subject keywords | Engineering Design (Phase C/D).Power | |
subject keywords | Mission Operations and Ground Support Systems.Mission control Planning | |
subject keywords | Program Management.Communications between different offices and contractor personnel | |
subject keywords | Program Management.Cross Agency coordination | |
subject keywords | Safety and Mission Assurance.Product Assurance |