• 0
    • ارسال درخواست
    • حذف همه
    • Industrial Standards
    • Defence Standards
  • درباره ما
  • درخواست موردی
  • فهرست استانداردها
    • Industrial Standards
    • Defence Standards
  • راهنما
  • Login
  • لیست خرید شما 0
    • ارسال درخواست
    • حذف همه
View Item 
  •   YSE
  • Defence Standards
  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
  • View Item
  •   YSE
  • Defence Standards
  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
  • View Item
  • All Fields
  • Title(or Doc Num)
  • Organization
  • Year
  • Subject
Advanced Search
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Archive

NASA-LLIS-1733

Lessons Learned – Genesis Sample Return Mishap (2004)

Organization:
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Year: 2004

Abstract: Abstract:
The Genesis sample return mishap was attributed to a design error in which the gravity switches that activate the parachute deployment sequence were phased (oriented) incorrectly so that their mechanisms could not detect the atmospheric entry. Mission critical functions should have functional backups as well as redundant hardware. Ensure that heritage designs that have been modified are fully tested, that design engineers fully understand the system function of their hardware, and that peer reviews of critical functions achieve full fidelity.
URI: https://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/93390
Subject: Additional Categories.
Collections :
  • NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
  • Download PDF : (21.36Kb)
  • Show Full MetaData Hide Full MetaData
  • Statistics

    NASA-LLIS-1733

Show full item record

contributor authorNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
date accessioned2017-09-04T16:30:05Z
date available2017-09-04T16:30:05Z
date copyright02/10/2004
date issued2004
identifier otherBOXCQCAAAAAAAAAA.pdf
identifier urihttps://yse.yabesh.ir/std/handle/yse/93390
description abstractAbstract:
The Genesis sample return mishap was attributed to a design error in which the gravity switches that activate the parachute deployment sequence were phased (oriented) incorrectly so that their mechanisms could not detect the atmospheric entry. Mission critical functions should have functional backups as well as redundant hardware. Ensure that heritage designs that have been modified are fully tested, that design engineers fully understand the system function of their hardware, and that peer reviews of critical functions achieve full fidelity.
languageEnglish
titleNASA-LLIS-1733num
titleLessons Learned – Genesis Sample Return Mishap (2004)en
typestandard
page6
statusActive
treeNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA):;2004
contenttypefulltext
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Accident Investigation
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Flight Equipment
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Flight Operations
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Ground Operations
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Hardware
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Mishap Reporting
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Payloads
subject keywordsAdditional Categories.Spacecraft
subject keywordsEngineering Design (Phase C/D).
subject keywordsEngineering Design (Phase C/D).Spacecraft and Spacecraft Instruments
subject keywordsMission Operations and Ground Support Systems.
subject keywordsMission Operations and Ground Support Systems.Mission control Planning
subject keywordsProgram Management.
subject keywordsProgram Management.Contractor relationships
subject keywordsSafety and Mission Assurance.
subject keywordsSafety and Mission Assurance.Product Assurance
subject keywordsSafety and Mission Assurance.Review systems and boards
subject keywordsSystems Engineering and Analysis.
subject keywordsSystems Engineering and Analysis.Engineering design and project processes and standards
subject keywordsSystems Engineering and Analysis.Planning of requirements verification processes
DSpace software copyright © 2017-2020  DuraSpace
نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
yabeshDSpacePersian
 
DSpace software copyright © 2017-2020  DuraSpace
نرم افزار کتابخانه دیجیتال "دی اسپیس" فارسی شده توسط یابش برای کتابخانه های ایرانی | تماس با یابش
yabeshDSpacePersian